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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 









UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE; CHRISSI RAWAK, individually and in her capacity 
as Athletic Director of the University of Delaware; THOMAS LAPENTA, individually 
and in his capacity as Human Resources Director 
___________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
(No. 1:17-cv-01156) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 6, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 





McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Bonnie Kenny and Cindy Gregory appeal the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendants, the University of Delaware and related officials, on their 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




employment discrimination claims.1 Kenny and Gregory are the former coaches of the 
University of Delaware women’s volleyball team and a married lesbian couple who were 
in their fifties at time of their termination. They allege that they were fired because of 
their age and their sexual orientation in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After exercising plenary review over 
the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants,2 we will 
affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thorough 
Memorandum Opinion.3  
We agree that there were multiple non-discriminatory reasons for firing Kenny 
and Gregory as outlined by the District Court.4 We further agree that Kenny and Gregory 
failed to show that the multiple, consistent reasons for replacing them were a mere 
pretext for age or sexual orientation discrimination.5 Because a reasonable factfinder 
 
1 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
2 See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008). 
3 B12-17. 
4 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (explaining that 
the defendant may defeat a plaintiff’s prima facie discrimination case under Title VII by 
identifying legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the employment action). The same 
framework applies to ADEA claims, Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d 
Cir. 2009), and discrimination claims under the DDEA, Giles v. Family Court of 
Delaware, 411 A.2d 599, 601-02 (Del. 1980). 
5 See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a plaintiff  
can show that claimed legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons are a pretext for 
discrimination by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 




could not conclude based on this record that the defendants’ decision to fire plaintiffs 
stemmed from a discriminatory motive in violation of state or federal law, we will affirm 
the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. 
 
action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence”) 
(internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
